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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                           
_____________ 
 
No. 10-3458 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JAMAL TURNQUEST, 
a/k/a POP  
a/k/a P 
 
JAMAL TURNQUEST, 
    Appellant 
 
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
District Court  No. 2-07-cr-00737-002 
District Judge: The Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 13, 2012 
 
Before: SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
ROSENTHAL, District Judge
*
 
 
 
                                                 
*   
The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, District Judge for the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation. 
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(Filed: September 17, 2012) 
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
  
A jury convicted Jamal Turnquest of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and 
the District Court sentenced him to 264 months imprisonment.  Turnquest appeals 
his conviction and sentence.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 On August 6, 2008, Turnquest was indicted and charged with conspiracy to 
distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (“Count 1”).  The 
government alleged that Kareem Smith was the head of a conspiracy to distribute 
cocaine and crack cocaine in parts of Philadelphia and Cecil County, Maryland 
from November 2002 through September 2007 (referred to in the Indictment as the 
Smith Crack Cocaine Gang or “SCCG”)).  It further alleged that Turnquest was a 
co-conspirator and principal manager of the SCCG. 
 On June 2, 2009, following a jury trial, Turnquest was convicted on Count 1.  
On July 8, 2009, Turnquest filed a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c).  On March 10, 2010, the District Court 
denied Turnquest’s motion. 
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 On June 28, 2010, the District Court held a hearing to assist it in sentencing 
Turnquest and his co-defendants.  At this hearing, the parties introduced evidence 
as to the applicability, if any, of sentencing enhancements.     
On July 16, 2010, the District Court issued an order determining that 
Turnquest’s base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (2008) was 38.1 The 
Court further concluded that two enhancements were appropriate: +2 because the 
offense involved a dangerous weapon pursuant to § 2D1.1(b)(1); and +3 because 
he was a principal manager in the SCCG pursuant to § 3B1.1(b).
2
  The Court 
further determined that Turnquest had no criminal history points.  Thus, the 
District Court concluded that Turnquest had a total offense level of 43, a criminal 
history category of I, and a sentencing guidelines range of lifetime imprisonment.   
 On August 10, 2010, the District Court imposed a sentence on Turnquest of 
264 months imprisonment to be followed by a 5-year period of supervised release, 
along with a $1,000 fine and a $100 special assessment. 
                                                 
1  
The District Court sentenced Turnquest under the 2008 version of the Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual.  Thus, all references to the Guidelines Manual in this opinion are to 
the 2008 version.    
  
2 
The only aspect of Turnquest’s sentence that he is appealing is the District Court’s 
determination that a principal manager enhancement was appropriate.  Turnquest does 
not challenge the District Court’s determination of his base offense level or that the 
offense involved a dangerous weapon.   
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 Turnquest appealed his conviction and sentence.
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II. 
A. 
 Turnquest argues that, although the evidence could lead a jury to conclude 
that he was often in the company of Smith and that he understood that Smith was 
engaging in illegal activities, the evidence was insufficient to prove that he joined 
the SCCG. 
We review a challenge to the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de 
novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.  United 
States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 154 (3d Cir. 2006).   We must sustain the verdict if 
“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).  It is 
immaterial that the evidence also permits a “less sinister conclusion” because “the 
evidence need not be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt.”  United 
States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 134 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  In sum, the verdict must stand unless the insufficiency of the evidence is 
clear.  United States v. Smith, 294 F.3d 473, 477 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
                                                 
3
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
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 The elements of a conspiracy charge under § 846 are: (1) a unity of purpose 
between the alleged conspirators; (2) an intent to achieve a common goal; and (3) 
an agreement to work together toward that goal.  See United States v. Iglesias, 535 
F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 A reasonable jury could conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the government, sufficiently demonstrates Turnquest’s participation in 
the SCCG.  This evidence includes testimony by members of the SCCG that 
Turnquest: sold drugs for Smith (Supp. App. 105, 271-73, 278, 314); bagged crack 
for Smith (Supp. App. 100-02; 615); delivered crack to members of the SCCG 
(Supp. App. 282, 287, 373A-76A); was arrested at least three times for drug 
offenses that involved the SCCG (Supp. App. 284); and oversaw the SCCG’s 
operations, including directing a member of the SCCG to: drive Turnquest to pick 
up crack, deliver drugs to buyers in exchange for money, and rent hotel rooms for 
the SCCG using money provided by Smith or Turnquest (Supp. App. 315-18, 327-
30).  Moreover, Smith testified that he and Turnquest were working together in the 
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cocaine business.  Supp. App. 614, 624.
4
  Based on this and other evidence, a 
reasonable jury could infer that Turnquest was a member of the SCCG.   
Accordingly, the District Court did not err in denying Turnquest’s Rule 29 
motion for judgment of acquittal.    
B. 
 Turnquest argues that, at sentencing, the District Court erred in determining 
that he was a manager of the SCCG and applying a three level enhancement to his 
offense level under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1.  We review the District Court’s decision for 
clear error.  See United States v. Richards, 674 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(“[W]here . . . sentencing adjustments require a district court to closely examine a 
set of facts and determine whether they fit within the definition of the adjustment 
before deciding whether to apply the adjustment, we should review that decision 
for clear error only.”); see, e.g., United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 216-17 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (reviewing a district court’s determination of the defendant’s role under 
§ 3B1.1 for clear error).    
                                                 
4 
Turnquest argues that he, like the defendant in United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144 
(3d Cir. 2001), never agreed to work with Smith or any other members of the SCCG to 
achieve a common goal or advance a common interest.  However, Pressler is inapposite 
for primarily two reasons.  First, the issue in Pressler was whether a conspiracy existed at 
all, not whether a particular individual was a member of a documented conspiracy.  See 
Id. at 151.  Second, the evidence demonstrates that Turnquest, unlike the defendant in 
Pressler, was so closely connected with the conspiracy that a reasonable jury could infer 
he shared a unity of purpose with — and joined — the SCCG with the intent to further its 
common goals.    
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 Under § 3B1.1(b), sentencing courts may increase the defendant’s offense 
level by three levels where “the defendant was a manager or supervisor . . . and the 
criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.”  
To qualify for the enhancement, the defendant must have managed or supervised at 
least one other participant in the illegal activity.  See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2.  A 
“participant” is one who is criminally responsible for the offense, but that person 
need not have been convicted.  See id. cmt. n.1.  A manager or supervisor is one 
who “exercise[s] some degree of control over others involved in the offense.”  
United States v. Chau, 293 F.3d 96, 103 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. 
Fuller, 897 F.2d 1217, 1220 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
 Here, the District Court did not plainly err by determining that Turnquest 
was a manager or supervisor of the SCCG under § 3B1.1.  Michael Martin, who 
was a member of the SCCG, testified at trial that Turnquest, inter alia, generally 
oversaw the SCCG’s operations and directed him to: pick up drugs from suppliers, 
deliver drugs to buyers in exchange for money, and rent hotel rooms using money 
provided by Smith or Turnquest.  See Supp. App. 315-18, 327-30.  Similarly, 
Smith testified that Turnquest was his “right-hand man.”  See Supp. App. 614.  
Moreover, Turnquest does not challenge the District Court’s determination that the 
SCCG had at least five participants.  Thus, the District Court did not plainly err by 
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applying the enhancement.
5
 
 Accordingly, we will affirm.
6
    
 
                                                 
5
 Contrary to Turnquest’s argument, the District Court’s application of an enhancement 
under § 3B1.1 did not violate the rule set forth in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000).  Turnquest was convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 
which carries a statutory maximum term of life imprisonment.  See 21 U.S.C. § 
841(b)(1).  The District Court’s application of the enhancement did not increase 
Turnquest’s potential maximum sentence, and thus, Apprendi is inapposite.   
 
6
 On July 20, 2011, Turnquest filed his briefing in this appeal through counsel.  After the 
briefing was filed, new counsel — Patrick Connors — was appointed for Turnquest.  On 
June 18, 2012, Turnquest filed a motion seeking the appointment of new counsel based 
on Connors’ apparent refusal to include certain arguments that Turnquest had requested.  
We construe Turnquest’s motion as one for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  
Such a claim, however, is generally inappropriate on direct appeal.  See United States v. 
Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271-73 (3d Cir. 2003).  Accordingly, we will deny Turnquest’s 
claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel without prejudice to his right to raise 
this claim on collateral attack. 
 
 
